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NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) is responsible for the procurement and
allocation of human organs in the United Kingdom.1 Its main role is to ‘‘ensure
that organs donated for transplant are matched and allocated to patients in a fair
and unbiased way.’’2 NHSBT’s liver allocation policies are underpinned by the
National Liver Transplant Standards, a document published by the Department
of Health in 2005 to oversee patient care, patient assessment, liver allocation and
transplantation, education and training, and research and development.3 NHSBT
has developed its own liver allocation protocols under the powers assigned to
it by the Department of Health, which include a ‘‘super-urgent’’ liver allocation
policy, a Liver Allocation Sequence, and pediatric candidate liver allocation
protocols.4
In the United States, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) governs
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), which maintains
the national organ transplant database (UNet).5 UNOS similarly assures the
public that it has ‘‘established an organ sharing system that maximizes the effi-
cient use of deceased organs through fair and timely allocation.’’6 UNOS was
formally established by the National Organ Transplantation Act in 1984. In 1999,
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services published the Final Rule,
a federal regulation outlining the operation of the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network, which was launched in 1986. Similar to the United
Kingdom, UNOS has also developed its own liver allocation policy, entitled
Policy 3.6. This policy implements a unique mortality scoring system for both
adult and pediatric liver transplant candidates.
The primary job of both agencies is to allocate human organs to suitable
transplant candidates using objective medical criteria. In light of the shortage of
livers, NHSBT and UNOS are under considerable pressure to allocate their
resources not only to those who need them the most but to those who will derive
the most benefit out of them (referred to hereafter as the need principle and the
‘‘best bet’’ principle). A combination of need and efficiency will ensure that when
a candidate is selected for transplantation, the allocation is morally justified and
economical. Can an organ procurement agency successfully manage the battle
between need and efficiency through the creation of ethically balanced organ
allocation protocols? For example, do NHSBT and UNOS consider need and
efficiency equally when allocating livers, or is the need criterion (i.e., medical
urgency) often the dominant factor when selecting the appropriate candidate?
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Alternatively, how far can considerations of ‘‘best bet’’ apply, and how ethical are
the limits? Particularly vulnerable groups of candidates—such as the very old,
the frail, and minority groups—may be particularly vulnerable in the light of
economically based allocation policies.
What follows below is a comparative analysis of the national and agency-level
liver allocation procedures in both countries and the ethical principles underpinning
them.
The United Kingdom: NHS Blood and Transplant
NHSBT is the United Kingdom’s primary organ procurement agency. It is respon-
sible for matching and allocating donated human organs nationwide. There are
approximately 8,000 candidates registered on the official National Transplant
Database,7 and in the period from April 1, 2008 to March 31, 2009 there were 667
successful liver transplants.8
National Liver Allocation Guidelines
In 2005, the Department of Health published its National Liver Transplant
Standards to support NHSBT’s professional practice. The National Standards
include diagnostic, assessment, allocation, transplantation, training, and de-
velopment objectives. Although it is left up to the NHSBT to incorporate these
National Standards into its own policies, the Department of Health does reveal
the principles that it believes should underpin the liver allocation process.
First and foremost, the National Standards support the separation of urgent
candidates from nonurgent candidates during the selection process: ‘‘Because
patients referred with fulminate hepatic failure are likely to die within a few days
of diagnosis, they receive priority over all other patients in a ‘super-urgent’ cate-
gory. Patients with primary liver graft failure or early hepatic artery thrombosis
are also eligible for ‘super-urgent’ listing’’ (Standards 3.5 and 3.20).9 The Depart-
ment of Health is also mindful of economical issues when listing candidates:
‘‘Patients assessed by experienced psychiatrists as likely to continue their habit
are usually regarded as unsuitable for liver transplantation. Based upon the
principle that donor livers should be placed according to greatest benefit, it is
currently recommended that organs should be allocated to patients who have at
least 50% chance of surviving five years post transplant’’ (Standards 3.11 and
3.13).10 These statements reveal two things: there is considerable pressure on the
Department of Health to allocate its resources efficiently and a candidate’s
medical need is a chief allocation priority. On candidate selection, the National
Standards list a generous collection of medical factors to be calculated to find
a suitable match: ‘‘matching for age, size and blood group are important and,
other factors being equal, time on the waiting list will then identify the recipient.
However, the condition of patients on the waiting list and the quality of the
donor liver must also be taken into account. Patients who deteriorate whilst
waiting for a liver transplant may become too sick to stand a reasonable chance of
surviving the procedure. They might have to be removed from the waiting list’’
(confirmed by standard 3.19).11 The Department of Health has listed many
medical criteria for NHSBT to calculate, allowing for the ‘‘best bet’’ candidate to
be found among a rather large pool of candidates. Interestingly, it appears that
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‘‘waiting time’’ (the ‘‘first-come first-served’’ principle) is withheld as an
allocation criteria until two or more equal matches are found. This would ensure
that the deciding criterion is impartial and fair.
In line with the Department of Health’s recommendations, the NHSBT has
separated liver transplant candidates into two main categories in their 2009
Protocols and Guidelines for Adults Undergoing Liver Transplantation: super-
urgent and elective.12 Super-urgent candidates must be diagnosed with one of
the following medical ailments: paracetamol poisoning, seronegative hepatitis,
acute Wilson’s disease, hepatic artery thrombosis, graft dysfunction, or liver
failure.13 The NHSBT has also incorporated the Department of Health’s econom-
ical ‘‘50% survival/five year rule’’ into its 2009 Protocols, stating that candidates
who do not meet one of the super-urgent criteria will be accepted for elective
transplantation if this rule applies to them in addition to being diagnosed with
chronic liver disease or failure, hepatocellular carcinoma, a variant syndrome, or
acceptance through the National Appeals Panel.14 These rather strict admittance
criteria by the NHSBT reflect the Department of Health’s firm approach: a
candidate must be in grave need, but he must also be an efficient host for an
organ. The NHSBT openly expresses throughout its 2009 Protocols that it wishes
to measure benefit: ‘‘There remains a gap between the number of patients
suitable for liver transplantation and the number of donated human livers.
Decisions on selection of patients for liver transplantation have to be made on
criteria other than just medical need. . . . [S]uch protocols must balance the often
competing issues of equity of access for all with overall utility (or benefit in
outcome).’’15 It is important that as an organ procurement agency, the NHSBT is
seen supporting many resource allocation principles to allow for a varied and
balanced organ allocation system. A candidate’s medical need now appears to
share the spotlight with considerations of equal access and efficiency—is the
NHSBT taking a more objective approach? Not quite. The NHSBT opens an
entirely new category of candidates: individuals who are not super-urgent or
elective may also be considered for transplantation if ‘‘they have an anticipated
length of life of less than one year or an unacceptable quality of life,’’ and the
5-year posttransplant survival rate must come with ‘‘a quality of life acceptable to
the patient.’’16 This loosening of the strict admittance criteria by the NHSBT and
an understanding of unique candidate circumstances show how an application of
the need principle can open important doors for particular candidates who
would ordinarily be excluded from transplantation.
Regarding the selection of candidates, the NHSBT inserts an interesting
directive into its 2009 Protocols: ‘‘Other medical and social factors (such as
alcohol or drug misuse, age or antisocial life style) are not directly relevant other
than whether they affected the 50% survival/five year rule.’’17 The Department of
Health stated in its National Standards that ‘‘habitual’’ candidates would not be
suitable for transplantation because of their limited benefit,18 but the NHSBT
appears to be actively encouraging the assessment of social factors if these factors
are expected to scupper a candidate’s efficiency. This highly economical approach
is not good news for most candidates: it is difficult to imagine any instance in
which a candidate’s antisocial behavior (e.g., substance abuse) or age (e.g., con-
siderably elderly) would not have a direct impact on her efficiency as a transplant
recipient, particularly if her social behavior contributed to her organ failure. It is
understandable that the NHSBT feels a weighty responsibility to ensure longevity
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for transplanted organs and guarantee that the selected candidate is strong
enough—both physically and mentally—to survive her surgery and postoperative
care, but this rather strict application of the ‘‘best bet’’ principle could be
interpreted as an overruling of a candidate’s medical need. If a candidate is not
physically, mentally, or socially efficient, her level of need (e.g., one day from
death) will matter little to the NHSBT. Additionally, the consideration of social
factors may also be construed by some as an application of the moral worth
principle, which should not, ideally, be a basis for scarce organ allocation.
It has been shown that the Department of Health and NHS Blood and
Transplant consider medical need and efficiency to be primary considerations
when allocating scarce resources. A combination of need and efficiency is vital to
ensure that the gravest of candidates receive their treatment first and that they
will acquire a significant benefit from it. However, this combination also suggests
that super-urgent places will be tightly restricted to those who, with a transplant,
could show a 50% chance of surviving for at least 5 years, thus excluding many
gravely ill patients from transplantation. This ‘‘combined’’ policy actually demon-
strates how the need principle can be ‘‘trumped’’ by the ‘‘best bet’’ principle
when an organ procurement agency wishes to promote ‘‘sustainable’’ organ allo-
cation. There is also be a sprinkling of additional principles in the U.K. National
Standards, such as the ‘‘first-come first-served’’ principle, to encourage liver
allocation in favor of objective selection. However, can the radically impartial
‘‘first-come first-served’’ approach really be in the best interests of transplant
candidates?
Agency-Level Liver Allocation Protocols
NHS Blood and Transplant allocates donor livers according to its Liver Organ
Sharing Principles, which were first published in 1999 by UK Transplant.19 The
1999 Principles outline liver allocation procedures for super-urgent candidates,
elective candidates (the Liver Allocation Sequence), and pediatric candidates.
Super urgent candidates in the United Kingdom are ranked according to
minimal criteria: ‘‘the sequence of offers for recipients registered as Super Urgent
will be strictly in relation to blood group and the time of registration: the blood
group compatible patient having been registered the longest at any one time
taking priority, and thereafter in reverse chronological order by time of
registration.’’20 Blood group is the only relevant medical factor to be calculated
by the NHSBT when selecting a super-urgent candidate. This criterion will only
reveal which super-urgent candidate is the ‘‘best bet’’ for the available organ, not
the candidate’s super-urgent status. Some may be closer to death than others.
What about the progression of the candidate’s disease? A more needs-based test
could include a mortality scoring system to ensure that the gravest of super-
urgent candidates will be selected first, although the Department of Health has
made it clear that this is not the favored approach in the United Kingdom:
‘‘Although prognostic models can predict survival without transplant for a few
specific liver diseases, there is no scoring system that has universal applicability.
Scoring systems may aid clinical decision-making but should not replace expert
clinical judgment.’’21 The NHSBT distances itself further from a needs-based
approach by incorporating registration time into its super-urgent policy. The
‘‘first-come first-served’’ principle does not require any medical calculations,
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making the choice wholly impartial when a transplant candidate is selected. But
within in a ‘‘super-urgent’’ category, is not the most urgent candidate selected
first? The application of a ‘‘first-come first-served’’ principle to a super-urgent
scheme contradicts the very meaning of the category.
The Liver Allocation Sequence was first created by UK Transplant as a means
of allocating donor livers to all other liver transplant candidates.22 The process is
described in UKT’s 1999 Principles:
The liver allocation sequence will be used to advise designated centres23
of the availability of a donor organ, regardless of whether a patient of the
appropriate blood group is registered from their unit on the National Transplant
Database at the time. The sequence will be sequenced according to each
centre’s transplant activity, based on a rolling 4-week period. The centre
with the least number of transplants during this period will appear top
of the sequence, down to the centre with the most number of trans-
plants. Offers will be made to non-designated centres in accordance
with the liver allocation sequence only when a suitable blood group
recipient is registered from their unit on the National Transplant
Database.24
This unique Sequence is curious. An elective candidate will only become
available for selection if (i) he is placed in an underresourced designated center
or (ii) he is placed in a nondesignated center (considered after designated centers)
and he is a blood match. Why would an organ procurement agency expressly
ignore blood match when searching for a transplant candidate? Why implement
this policy for underresourced centers only? Should underresourcing have an
influence on organ allocation, or take precedence over finding the ‘‘best bet’’
candidate? The Liver Allocation Sequence may be an example of the justice
principle, which claims that resources should be shared out impartially using
objective and fair criteria. The Liver Allocation Sequence achieves total impar-
tiality through its centeer rota, enabling all transplant centers to acquire an equal
share of livers, but it becomes too impartial when ignoring candidate blood
match. Blood match is vital in organ transplantation to ensure a successful graft.
Ideally, the allocation of livers should depend upon relevant medical character-
istics, such as progression of disease, mortality status, and blood, age, size, and
tissue match. A blind, justice-based policy such as the Liver Allocation Sequence,
which selects eligible candidates through the identification of underresourced
centers, is not in the best interests of transplant candidates, unless there were
enough ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ livers to go around.
Once a donor liver completes the Sequence and arrives at a transplant center,
a candidate must be selected for transplantation: ‘‘There may be many factors
such as the quality and size of the liver and blood group, the health of the patient
and pressures on beds and staff, which will influence the choice of recipient.
When equal post-transplant outcome is anticipated then the sicker patient would
normally be transplanted first.’’25 The number of allocation principles listed by
the NHSBT is extensive and shows a substantial departure from the previous
justice-based policy. In particular, it is encouraging to see medical need (i.e.,
patient health and urgency) working together with efficiency (i.e., quality of liver
and blood group) to select the appropriate candidate. Medical need appears to be
the overriding concern when two candidates are anticipated to have similar
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postoperative success. It is unfortunate that these diverse criteria are only
calculated after the donor liver has been allocated to an underresourced center
through the Sequence, where it may have ignored a blood-matching candidate at
a more local, well-resourced center. ‘‘Pressures on beds and staff’’ is a slightly
worrying criteria. This consideration casts an eye far beyond the candidate’s
immediate need or efficiency to measure the social and economical needs of other
patients and their hospital trusts. It is not known whether such wide consid-
erations should exert an influence over organ allocation policies, but staffing
problems and bed pressures could establish a postcode lottery of organ allocation
if incorporated into formal policies. This would be dreadfully unfair for all
transplant candidates.
It has been shown that the NHSBT is especially keen to allocate organs
according to the ‘‘best bet’’ principle: ‘‘Where possible the donor should be
matched to the recipient who is expected to obtain the largest transplant benefit
from the procedure (difference between survival with and without transplanta-
tion).’’26 This can be seen clearly in the United Kingdom’s super-urgent scheme,
which implements the strict ‘‘50% survival/five year’’ rule. The super-urgent
scheme may be open to additional scrutiny by only allocating livers according to
blood match and waiting time. A mortality scoring system could help to stratify
candidates according to their level of need inside the super-urgent category, thus
allowing for more accurate selections. Waiting time also fails to represent who
truly needs or would benefit from an organ transplant, as most candidates who
dwell for several weeks or months on a transplant waiting list may not be gravely
urgent cases. In practice, therefore, we see in the NHSBT’s agency-level protocols
what we observed in the Department of Health’s National Standards: a combi-
nation of need, efficiency, and justice. These principles are vital to allow for
equitable organ allocation policies, but this arrangement will only support
candidates if they are considered to be the ‘‘best bet’’ for a donor organ at the
time of selection. In other words, regardless of a candidates’ urgency or waiting
time, his economical status will prevail as the NHSBT’s organ allocation priority.
The perplexing Liver Allocation Sequence leaves an important ethical question
unanswered: can an organ procurement agency ever justify ignoring a local or
well-resourced blood-matching candidate simply to uphold a radically impartial
strategy of resource allocation? It is rather frustrating to find that once a liver has
been allocated to an underresourced center through the Sequence, only then are
vital medical criteria calculated to select the most urgent, most efficient candidate.
What of the local, blood-matching candidate who was excluded by the Sequence?
Why are only nonurgent candidates subjected to this fluctuating and justice-based
allocation policy? If the NHSBT feels pressure to publish equitable and unbiased
protocols, they need not worry, as it is completely acceptable for an organ
procurement agency to be partial and selective when allocating such a personal
and scarce medical resource. Bearing the scarcity in mind, is this radically
impartial approach really in the best interests of transplant candidates?
The United States: The United Network for Organ Sharing
UNOS is the primary organ procurement agency in the United States. It is
responsible for matching and allocating donated human organs nationwide.
There are approximately 106,621 candidates registered on UNet,27 and in the
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period from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2009, there were 6,320 successful
liver transplants.28
National Liver Allocation Guidelines
The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984 is brief, but it clearly outlines the
primary objective of UNOS: ‘‘[UNOS] shall have a system to allocate donated
organs equitably among transplant patients according to established medical
criteria.’’29 There are further objectives listed in the Act for the Organ Pro-
curement and Transplantation Network: ‘‘The OPTN shall assist in the nation-
wide distribution of organs equitably among transplant patients, and shall carry
out studies and demonstration projects for the purpose of improving procedures
for organ allocation and transplantation among populations with special needs,
including children and individuals who are members of racial or ethnic minority
groups, and among populations with limited access to transportation.’’30 These
primary objectives establish two goals: (i) the equitable distribution of organs and
(ii) the appropriate care of minority candidates. The first goal is founded upon
the principle of justice. The second goal shows an application of the need
principle, promoting a ‘‘reaching out’’ to minority candidates who are tradition-
ally excluded from complex medical care on social, age, financial, or racial
grounds. The mention of minority candidates at a national level also reinforces
the impetus upon UNOS to design policies that are ‘‘fit for all.’’ Regarding
efficiency, the 1984 Act clearly requires UNOS to measure ‘‘medical criteria’’
(noted above) when allocating organs, and this ‘‘best bet’’ approach has been
enshrined in Policy 3.6 (in detail below).
A more detailed national framework in place to manage the allocation of donor
organs in the United States is the Final Rule, which was published in 1999 to
establish the roles, administrative duties, and organ allocation objectives of the
OPTN.31 Organ allocation objectives are provided in specific detail at section
121.8 and are split up into sections: policy development, allocation performance
goals, and allocation performance indicators. According to ‘‘policy develop-
ment,’’ the OPTN Board of Directors must develop equitable allocation polices
that are ‘‘based on sound medical judgment, achieve the best use of donated
organs, [are] designed to avoid wasting organs, to avoid futile transplants, and to
promote patient access to transplantation.’’32 There appears to be a slight ethical
contradiction to these objectives. If the OPTN must allocate organs to the ‘‘best’’
candidates according to the ‘‘best bet’’ principle (which, by its very nature, does
not support equality), how can the OPTN also promote ‘‘access to transplanta-
tion’’ that is underpinned by impartiality? Perhaps the Department of Health and
Human Services is encouraging the OPTN to open its doors to a wide variety of
candidates in accordance with the need principle, and then to allocate organs
efficiently and realistically according to the ‘‘best bet’’ principle. The OPTN
manages to achieve this complex balance under Policy 3.6 (below).
According to ‘‘allocation performance goals,’’ the OPTN must, when developing
organ allocation policies, meet the following criteria:
(1) standardize the criteria for determining suitable transplant candidates
through the use of minimum criteria, expressed through objective and
measurable medical criteria, for adding individuals to, and removing
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candidates from, organ transplant waiting lists; (2) setting priority
rankings, expressed through objective and measurable medical criteria,
for patients or categories of patients who are medically suitable
candidates for transplantation to receive transplants. These rankings
shall be ordered from most to least medically urgent; (3) distributing
organs over as broad a geographic area as feasible in order of decreasing
medical urgency.33
The Final Rule shows a strong allegiance to the ‘‘best bet’’ principle in these
economical goals. The OPTN must use minimal, objective, measurable, medical
criteria to allocate organs, alluding to the selection of the best, most efficient
candidate for transplantation. This strict scheme will, in turn, ensure that the
OPTN will reduce wastage. The only medical criterion that is minimal, measur-
able, and objective is a blood test result, which can be used to calculate urgency (a
needs-based criteria). The Department of Health and Human Services also
encourages the OPTN to rank candidates according to level of urgency, which
is reflective of the need principle. This ethical balance is encouraging, but it must
be remembered that in addition to these seemingly even-handed goals, the OPTN
must still avoid ‘‘wasting organs’’ or conducting ‘‘futile transplants.’’ Hardly any
room remains for maneuver or for the inclusion of ‘‘borderline’’ criteria, such as
‘‘waiting time’’ or ‘‘pressures on beds and staff,’’ as was observed in some U.K.
protocols (above). UNOS and the OPTN have successfully developed a needs-
based scoring system in line with the Final Rule objectives, which calculates a
candidate’s level of urgency according to measurable medical criteria (more below).
The last relevant section in the Final Rule, entitled ‘‘allocation performance
indicators,’’ describes how the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services will
oversee the OPTN and its policies:
For each organ-specific policy, the OPTN shall provide to the Secretary
data to assist the Secretary in assessing organ procurement and
allocation, and access to transplantation. Such data shall include: risk-
adjusted total life-years pre- and post-transplant, risk-adjusted patient
and graft survival rates following transplantation, risk-adjusted waiting
time and risk-adjusted transplantation rates, as well as data regarding
patients whose status or medical urgency was misclassified and patients
who were inappropriately kept off a waiting list or retained on a waiting
list.34
The Secretary of Health will use the above data to measure just how well the
OPTN (and each transplant center) is meeting the objectives listed under
‘‘allocation performance goals’’ (described above). This section of the Final Rule
reveals a collection of ethical priorities. First, by confirming that the OPTN is
regulated by a higher body to which it must justify its policies and procedures
and through an express commitment by the Secretary of Health to assess organ
allocation policies in relation to their application of objective, measurable,
medical criteria, the Final Rule illustrates a strong allegiance to the needs of
transplant candidates (the need principle). Second, the collections of data listed
above (which will reach the Secretary in statistical form) give the impression that
the U.S. organ transplantation system is very goal driven. To put it another way,
this section could be translated as exclaiming: ‘‘the OPTN must be efficient, . . . it
must meet its goals, . . . it must minimize waste, . . . it must meet its targets, . . . it
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must calculate ‘best bet.’’’ This strict economical approach could influence UNOS
and the OPTN when allocating organs and drafting policies (similar to the ‘‘50%
survival/five year’’ rule in the United Kingdom). If this is the case, UNOS and
the OPTN should be mindful so as to not undermine the needs of candidates
when striving to meet their economical goals.
It has been shown that the Department of Health and Human Services in the
United States places an overwhelming burden on UNOS/the OPTN to be objec-
tive, resourceful, and efficient when allocating scarce organs. The National Organ
Transplantation Act of 1984 lists ‘‘equitable distribution’’ and ‘‘appropriate care
of minority patients’’ as key priorities for the OPTN, but these are overwhelmed
by a push for efficiency and practicality in the Final Rule. The expectation of
UNOS and the OPTN to avoid wasting organs and to allocate organs to the ‘‘best
bet’’ candidates adds considerable pressure to draft policies that are calculated
and minimal. UNOS and the OPTN must therefore be doubly sure that any
agency-level strategies maintain support for the best interests of the candidate.
Agency-Level Liver Allocation Protocols
In line with the objectives set down in the Final Rule, UNOS has developed a
liver allocation protocol entitled Policy 3.6. It employs a unique mortality scoring
system to separate transplant candidates into two categories: Status 1A and
MELD.
Policy 3.6 outlines its objectives as follows:
Each candidate will be assigned a status code or probability of candidate
death derived from a mortality risk score corresponding to the degree of
medical urgency, calculated in accordance with the Model for End-Stage
Liver Disease (MELD). Livers will be offered to candidates with an
assigned Status of 1A in descending point sequence with the candidate
having the highest number of points receiving the highest priority.
Following Status 1, livers will be offered to candidates based upon their
probability of candidate death derived from assigned MELD scores in
descending point sequence with the candidate having the highest
probability ranking receiving the highest priority.35
Policy 3.6 is similar to NHS Blood and Transplant’s Liver Organ Sharing
Principles (1999) in that it separates super-urgent candidates (Status 1A) from
all other candidates (MELD). However, UNOS prefers to implement a similar
allocation strategy—a mortality scoring system—to both groups of candidates,
a significantly different approach to NHSBT’s Liver Allocation Sequence, which
saw an impartial justice-based strategy applied to nonurgent candidates only.
The objectives of Policy 3.6 therefore indicate that medical need is a significant
allocation priority for UNOS, regardless of the category into which a candidate is
slotted, and shows a strong allegiance to the need principle. However, the scoring
systems for both groups of candidates require further analysis.
A candidate with fulminant liver failure who has less than 7 days left to live
will be categorized as Status 1A (i.e., super-urgent). Similar to the United
Kingdom, fulminant liver failure is strictly defined in the United States as
hepatic failure, transplant failure, hepatic artery thrombosis, or acute Wilson’s
disease. Alternatively, any candidates not meeting these criteria may have their
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case reviewed by the Regional Review Board and be upgraded to Status 1A in
this way.36 This strategy is supportive of candidate need. Local and regional
Status 1A candidates are grouped together, and livers are allocated to this wide
pool of candidates first, before being offered to MELD candidates (in detail
below) and then finally to national Status 1A candidates.37
Status 1A candidates are stratified according to points accrued, and this is
where Policy 3.6 begins to incorporate a wider variety of ethics. Blood match is
vital to Status 1A candidates to ensure that they are an efficient match to the
donor liver, and those with the same ABO blood type as the donor receive 10
points. Candidates who are compatible but not identical receive 5 points, and
incompatible candidates receive 0 points.38 This is a considerably strict applica-
tion of the ‘‘best bet’’ principle–the better the match, the more economical the
candidate, the higher the score, the more likely the transplant—and although it
does not completely exclude less efficient candidates from transplantation, they
are ranked lower on what appears to be a sliding scale of efficiency. Surprisingly,
the other primary consideration when selecting Status 1A candidates is waiting
time. According to Policy 3.6, Status 1A candidates will attract waiting time
points based on their length of tenure in that status. For example, the person
waiting the longest in blood group O will attract 10 points and so on in
descending order.39 This is a noteworthy incorporation of the ‘‘first-come first-
served’’ principle, which traditionally disregards medical need and efficiency as
allocation criteria. However, it is only used by UNOS in this instance as a final
means of distinguishing all Status 1A candidates who are an identical blood
match to the donor. Finally, in addition to urgency status (need), blood match
(‘‘best bet’’), and waiting time (‘‘first-come first-served’’), livers are also allocated
to Status 1A candidates according to donor size.40
Policy 3.6 appears to promote equality and equal access by reserving preference
for urgent, blood matching, long-awaiting candidates. There is little room for
discrimination because medical criteria underpin most of the Status 1A selection
process. UNOS shows a commitment to a combination of ethical allocation
principles, which in turn supports the best interests of the candidates and the
organ. UNOS also prefers to incorporate waiting time as an impartial calculation
when selecting a precise candidate, but a diversion from ‘‘need’’ may not be the best
option when selecting Status 1A candidates. Perhaps UNOS could design tighter
medical criteria to distinguish candidates based on closeness to death, as opposed
to how long they have waited. For example, out of all Status 1A candidates (who all
have 7 days left to live), some will inevitably be closer to death than others. Can this
be calculated in any way to provide more ‘‘justified’’ organ allocations?
Following Status 1A, Policy 3.6 creates a unique scoring system based on
a statistical formula, which accurately measures a candidate’s risk of morality
and level of urgency. Formally known as the MELD score (Model for End Stage
Liver Disease), it is a numerical scale that assigns each candidate a ‘‘score’’ based
on how urgently she or he requires a liver transplant, ranging from 6 (less ill) to
40 (gravely ill).41 The score is calculated using the results of three blood tests:
bilirubin, which measures how effectively the liver excretes bile, INR pro-
thrombin, which measures the liver’s ability to make blood clotting factors,
and creatinine, which measures kidney function (often associated with severe
liver disease).42 Additional points are not accrued in MELD as they are in Status
1A for blood match and waiting time, but these factors are considered alongside
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the MELD score in order to stratify MELD candidates inside their score bracket.
For example, once a MELD score is allocated (e.g., 30), candidates are stratified
inside their score bracket by blood type similarity (e.g., type O), and then lined
up by waiting time.43 Livers are allocated to candidates with MELD scores of 15
or above locally first, then regionally (not grouped together as in Status 1A).
Livers are then allocated to candidates with scores of less than 15 locally and then
regionally. Finally they are allocated nationally to all candidates.44
Several allocation principles are highlighted in the MELD scoring system. To
allocate a liver to MELD candidates, the highest MELD score is sought first,
ensuring that medical need is the overarching priority. Because there may be
several candidates with a MELD score of 38, blood match is the next chief selection
criteria: ‘‘within each MELD score, donor livers shall be offered to transplant
candidates who are ABO-identical with the donor first.’’45 This blood-matching
strategy will ensure that the selected MELD candidate is the ‘‘best bet’’ for the
donor liver. Waiting time is calculated next to guarantee that the blood-matching
candidate has been selected impartially. Regular MELD tests are taken during
a candidate’s tenure on the waiting list to make sure that the candidates’ score
accurately reflects his or her level of need. It follows from this that a candidate’s
score may fluctuate frequently. This does not affect the candidate’s access to
a donor liver; it simply provides the candidate with an accurate measurement of
his medical need and restratifies all candidates according to up-to-date test results.
Policy 3.6 states on this fluctuating issue that: ‘‘waiting time accrued while listed as
a lower MELD score will not be counted toward liver allocation if the candidate is
upgraded to a higher MELD score. If the candidate’s score decreases again, s/he
would keep the waiting time gained at the higher score.’’46 The calculation of
waiting time in MELD is another application by UNOS of the ‘‘first-come first-
served’’ principle. However, because waiting time is calculated after need and
efficiency for both MELD and Status 1A candidates, it may simply be considered
as a distinguishing tool and nothing more. The MELD policy by UNOS therefore
demonstrates the need principle, the ‘‘best bet’’ principle, and the ‘‘first-come’’
principle working together in the interests of the candidate.
It has been shown that despite the goal-driven objectives exposed in the Final
Rule, Policy 3.6 places candidate need at the top of the agenda by assigning
a Status 1A label to a candidate or estimating a candidate’s mortality score first and
calculating blood match and waiting time thereafter. The Final Rule encourages the
OPTN in particular to allocate organs based on ‘‘minimal, measurable and
objective criteria’’ and to ’’rank candidates according to urgency.’’ This has been
done specifically through the MELD scoring system (and to an extent through the
Status 1A points system). The combination of need, efficiency, and the ‘‘first-come
first-served’’ principle works well to ensure that the most urgent candidate will
also be the ‘‘best bet’’ and will be impartially selected. With waiting time as a mere
distinguishing tool, Policy 3.6 has shown to be supportive of a candidate’s best
interests and guarantees the fairest possible allocation of donor livers.
Final Thoughts: Which Organ Procurement Agency Implements the Most
Ethically Balanced Policy, and What Can Be Learned from Its Approach?
In the United Kingdom, the Department of Health and NHS Blood and Trans-
plant have demonstrated support for the resource allocation principles of need,
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‘‘best bet,’’ and justice. The Department of Health’s National Liver Transplant
Standards and the NHSBT’s several liver allocation protocols show a strong
allegiance to the ‘‘best bet’’ principle when prioritizing transplant candidates (i.e.,
the ‘‘50% survival/five year’’ rule). However, the U.K. system is not without its
ethical quandaries. It has been shown that efficiency will override medical need
in the United Kingdom when a candidate becomes too frail (ironically when his
or her real need for a transplant increases), and the ‘‘super-urgent’’ scheme only
allocates livers according to blood match and waiting time without implementing
a further mortality scoring system. Perhaps the calculations to determine urgency
in the United Kingdom could be a little more precise. An additional difficulty in
the United Kingdom is the Liver Allocation Sequence, which allocates livers to
underresourced transplant centers first, before searching for a blood match
thereafter. Under this justice-based policy, a local and more compatible candidate
would lose out to a remote, less urgent candidate. This is ethically problematic: it
does not support the best interests of the particularly deserving liver transplant
candidates.
The United Kingdom’s liver allocation system differs considerably from the
U.S. system. On a national level in the United States, we see goal-driven
economic objectives outlined by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services in the Final Rule, and at the agency level, objective, medical selection
criteria are implemented by the United Network for Organ Sharing in Policy 3.6.
What is particularly special about Policy 3.6 is that a candidate’s urgency is
calculated using strict medical criteria, leaving no room for maneuver or
discrimination, and it employs a balanced mix of allocation principles. The only
issue that remains unclear about Policy 3.6’s needs-based approach is how UNOS
still manages to avoid ‘‘futile’’ transplants as requested by the DHHS in the Final
Rule. Candidates who are labeled as either a Status 1A or MELD 35–40 may not
be the most efficient candidates, so where is the line drawn in the United States
between need and efficiency? Could the United Kingdom’s strict ‘‘50% survival/
five year rule’’ be an economical addition to Policy 3.6 for UNOS? If so, does this
mean that the United Kingdom is getting it right?
The main procedural and ethical difference between the NHSBT and UNOS is
the way in which they separate and categorize liver transplant candidates. The
NHSBT isolates nonurgent candidates by placing them into the independent
Liver Allocation Sequence, whereas UNOS connects both Status 1A and MELD
candidates by selecting them according to the same allocation principle (the need
principle via considerations of mortality) and stratifying them on the same
sliding scale of urgency.
The ‘‘super-urgent’’ liver transplant category in the United Kingdom is rather
narrow, listing only six qualifying medical conditions.47 If a U.K. candidate falls
outside of these criteria, he is placed into the Liver Allocation Sequence. The
Sequence is deliberately ignorant of blood match until an underresourced center
is selected. The NHSBT has underpinned this Sequence with a justice-based
policy, which aims to allocate livers impartially. The justice principle is important
in medicine to ensure that resource allocation policies do not discriminate in any
way (i.e., that allocation is blind), but in the field of organ transplantation, the
medical resource is exceedingly limited, so measuring a candidate’s need and
match to the organ first will yield much fairer results. To this end, the MELD
scoring system in the United States is quite unique in that it strictly calculates
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a candidate’s medical need (thus excluding social and emotional factors) and it
enables UNOS to stratify candidates according to blood match and waiting time
(an additional application of the ‘‘best bet’’ and ‘‘first-come first-served’’ princi-
ples). Considering the scarcity and complexity of the resource, this may be the
most ethically balanced liver allocation strategy that an organ procurement
agency could implement. It is of little surprise that the United Kingdom’s Liver
Advisory Group has begun to trial a UKELD scoring system in the United
Kingdom, despite the U.K.’s Department of Health stating that there is ‘‘no
scoring system with universal applicability.’’48 The UKELD score is based on the
MELD scoring system, using blood tests to calculate the mortality risk of the
candidate. In the United Kingdom, UKELD is currently used to select cases for
the waiting list, not for organ allocation, but Alexander Gimson, Chair of the U.K.
Liver Advisory Group, has advised that a new strategy is being piloted: ‘‘For
various reasons the [Sequence] may be a dissatisfactory allocation system. For
this reason, we are developing a new universal Liver Transplant Allocation
Scheme for the United Kingdom. We will be testing in a real time simulation
model the benefit of allocating organs on the basis of need, utility and finally on
the basis of transplant benefit the number of net life years gained from trans-
plantation.’’ (personal communication, Alexander Gimson, Chair of the U.K.
Liver Advisory Group, March 2010).
This diverse mix of allocation principles is good news for all U.K. liver
transplant candidates.
Despite the innovative MELD scoring system, a rather large uncertainty
emerges in Policy 3.6.. What of the ‘‘wasteful’’ and ‘‘futile’’ transplants that the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services expressly prohibit in the Final
Rule?49 UNOS has developed a needs-based liver allocation system without
describing in any real detail how Policy 3.6 will manage waste. It is not ideal for
an organ procurement agency to allocate livers according to candidate need only.
Needs-based allocation policies may overlook economical, social, or criminal
justice issues during candidate selection. Candidates who are significantly
diseased or considerably elderly will have the highest need. Candidates who
have caused their own liver disease through years of substance abuse may be
placed before all other candidates due to skyrocketing MELD scores. These
inefficient candidate selections may anger the public. The NHSBT implements
a strict ‘‘50% survival/five year rule’’ which can be traced back to the U.K.
Department of Health’s National Standards,50 confirming that U.K. candidates
falling below this threshold will be removed from the national waiting list.51 Can
this be implemented by UNOS in some way? At what point does a U.S.
transplant candidate become futile, and on what grounds can he be excluded
from life-saving treatment? When he shows a 60% chance of survival? 30%? Or
are futile candidates excluded from UNet altogether? Both the National Trans-
plantation Act of 1984 and the Final Rule do not reveal at which precise point
a candidate’s level of efficiency should override his medical urgency. As a result,
UNOS has emerged rather elusive on this matter compared to the United
Kingdom, which is honest about its ‘‘50% survival/five year rule’’ from the
outset. UNOS shows a limited desire to incorporate efficiency into its allocation
strategies by positioning ‘‘blood type’’ considerably high on their list of candidate
selection priorities for both Status 1A and MELD candidates, but this merely
skims the surface of the ‘‘best bet’’ resource allocation principle. Many other
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considerations must be calculated in order to combat ‘‘futile’’ and ‘‘wasteful’’
allocations and to find the most economically, physically, socially, financially, and
mentally suitable candidate. Perhaps these factors are assessed in more detail
during the earlier candidate assessment process. UNOS may have genuinely
decided not to implement the economical demands of the Final Rule. Perhaps
they are quite happy to simply measure medical urgency and to stratify
candidates according to blood type and waiting time only. Alternatively, futile
and wasteful candidates may be removed from UNet on a discretionary basis.
This would be rather disappointing, as UNOS has shown considerable potential
in Policy 3.6 to develop fair and ethical organ allocation strategies that are open,
honest, and transparent.
Both countries have felt the need to develop unique liver allocation protocols:
the Liver Allocation Sequence in the United Kingdom and Policy 3.6 in the United
States, but closer inspection has revealed that these protocols are underpinned by
entirely different resource allocation principles. It can be learned from the United
Kingdom that a blind and impartial resource allocation ethic such as the justice
principle may not be in the best interests of candidate when the resource in
question is scarce and personal (i.e., the resource must match the recipient,
requiring blood match and size match to be calculated in addition to urgency).
The separation of transplant candidates into different liver allocation sequences
may also isolate those who are ordinarily considered to be the ‘‘best bet’’ candidate
from receiving their life-saving medical resource. The United States, however, can
assure (as best as it can) that all liver transplant candidates are selected according
to their real needs, such as their medical urgency, their blood match, and their
waiting time (in that order). The best interests of the gravely ill candidates and the
likelihood of posttransplant success are considered as equally valuable outcomes
(although economical objectives appear to be limited). UNOS also combines all
liver transplant candidates on the same sliding scale of urgency, ensuring that
lower MELD candidates do not feel excluded from transplantation through being
exposed to a separate resource allocation strategy. The United Kingdom is now
adopting a UKELD scoring system, illustrating considerable support for the
United States’s needs-based approach to liver allocation.
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